November 13, 2026
How I Found a Pre-Authentication PII Leak Affecting Every User on a Major Indian Deals Platform
A single API call with a phone number. No OTP. No login. Full name, email, user ID, and referral code returned instantly.

By anshh.bohara
2 min read
The Target
The target was a popular Indian deals and experiences platform, part of one of India's largest food-tech conglomerates. Their mobile web app handled user login and signup through a JSON API.
I was poking around the authentication flow, specifically the endpoint that handles both login and signup: POST /mobile/api/user/loginOrSignupUser.
The Bug
The endpoint accepts a phone number in the request body and immediately returns the associated user's PII in the response. No OTP is sent. No verification occurs. The data comes back before any authentication step.
POST /mobile/api/user/loginOrSignupUser
Content-Type: application/json
{"primaryPhoneNumber": "98XXXXXXXX"}POST /mobile/api/user/loginOrSignupUser
Content-Type: application/json
{"primaryPhoneNumber": "98XXXXXXXX"}Response for a registered user:
{
"user": {
"id": "[REDACTED]",
"name": "[REDACTED]",
"email": "[REDACTED]@[REDACTED].com",
"mobile": "[REDACTED]",
"referralCode": "[REDACTED]",
"isReferralAllowed": false,
"totalVouchersPurchased": 0
},
"existingCustomer": true
}{
"user": {
"id": "[REDACTED]",
"name": "[REDACTED]",
"email": "[REDACTED]@[REDACTED].com",
"mobile": "[REDACTED]",
"referralCode": "[REDACTED]",
"isReferralAllowed": false,
"totalVouchersPurchased": 0
},
"existingCustomer": true
}No cookies. No session token. No Authorization header. Just a POST with a phone number.
Why This Is Worse Than a Simple Leak
The response is different depending on whether the phone number belongs to an existing user.
For an existing user, it returns full PII โ name, email, mobile, referral code, user ID. For a non-existing number, it creates a skeleton account with null fields for name and email.
This means the endpoint serves double duty as a user enumeration oracle. You can tell exactly which phone numbers have accounts by checking whether the name and email fields are populated.
Indian phone numbers are 10 digits. The full space is large, but targeted ranges (specific area codes, number series) narrow it significantly. And there was no rate limiting on the endpoint during my testing.
The Negative Controls
Three things that confirmed this wasn't by design:
1. No authentication required. The endpoint works with zero headers beyond Content-Type. No cookies, no session, no API key.
2. No OTP verification. The normal login flow should work like: send phone number, receive OTP, verify OTP, then get user data. Here, the PII comes back at step one, before any OTP is even sent.
3. Real data. The response returned a real name and real email address. I cross-referenced this with data from another finding on the same platform (an exposed Firestore database), and it matched. This wasn't test data.
The Impact
Mass PII harvesting. Iterate phone numbers, extract names and emails for every customer. No rate limiting observed.
User enumeration. The differential response reveals which phone numbers are registered, enabling targeted attacks.
Account correlation. User IDs are sequential integers, allowing cross-referencing with other API endpoints.
Referral fraud. Each user's referral code is exposed, potentially enabling abuse of the referral system.
Outcome
This was reported through a bug bounty platform. The finding was marked Informative because the asset was considered out of scope for the program. The bug was real, the impact was real, but scope is scope.
The Takeaway
Check what the login/signup flow returns before authentication completes. Developers often return user data in the initial lookup step to pre-populate the UI, forgetting that pre-auth means attacker-accessible. The OTP should be a gate, not a formality that happens after the data is already served.
The login endpoint is, by definition, unauthenticated. That makes it the richest pre-auth attack surface on any application. Don't skip it during recon.