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January 29, 2026

Turning Fuzzing Into $2,550: How a Simple Bug Gave Me Access to Employee IDs & Contracts

While testing on a private program (ima name it redacted.com) I started like any security researcher would, doing basic reconnaissance…

Muntadhar M. Ahmed

1 min read

While testing on a private program (ima name it redacted.com) I started like any security researcher would, doing basic reconnaissance (Subfinder + Httpx) and upon doing that i discovered an employee's portal

employees.redacted.com

But visiting it redirects to another subdomain for authentication, I tried several auth bypass methods but none worked

So i switched gears and started hunting on the employees portal instead. since i had no way of accessing anything on it I had to start by fuzzing

ffuf -u https://employees.redacted.com/FUZZ -w big.txt

But all endpoints redirected me to the login page

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To make things clearer, i filtered out those responses

ffuf -u https://employees.redacted.com/FUZZ -w big.txt -fw 13

and found one endpoint ( /assets) that was acting strange, instead of redirecting me to that login page it redirected me to /assets/ then that redirected me to the login page. so i decided to fuzz that as well and found another endpoint behaving the same way

/assets/stage → /assets/stage/

So i decided to fuzz inside that directory as well but nothing returned. Since the endpoint looked like an assets endpoint for me ( /assets/* ) i decided to fuzz files inside the dir and found this one file ( 001.png ) that was leaking an employee ID card:

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So i decided to fuzz .png files by generating a wordlist 001 — 999 using seq:

seq -w 1 999 > numbers.txt

Then fuzzed again:

ffuf -u https://employees.redacted.com/assets/stage/FUZZ.png -w numbers.txt -fw 13

And i was able to access hundreds of Employees ID cards, as well as .pdf leaked employees contracts

After reporting this finding i was awarded with 2550$

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