Traditional DevSecOps focuses on identifying and fixing vulnerabilities accumulated from code or containers that are created. In 2026, the shift will place a greater emphasis on Software Supply Chain Security. It means that we are not just protecting the code, but also every piece, including building, packaging, and delivering the end software product: dependencies, build systems, artifacts, and deployment pipelines.

In recent times, high-profile incidents shown that attackers often concentrate on the vulnerabilities outside the app's codebase. Let's consider the scenario of open-source libraries or malicious updates in your CI/CD pipelines. Dozens of other applications rely on the open-source libraries; if there are breaches, then trust will be broken, which ultimately leads to the downfall. The attackers don't just target your codebase; they break transitive dependency (dependency of dependency).

"In an era of increasing AI disruption and evolving threats from nation-states and cyber criminal groups, the ability to withstand and recover from cyber attacks is directly tied to a clear understanding of an organisation's software ecosystem," — Lanowitz

With Augmented workflows, the teams move faster, making it easier to creep into the risky components during the release times. The supply chain needs to be strengthened so that the origin of each artifact will be verified, who signed it, and what policies were complied with before deployment, which limits the blast radius and unexpected properties.

Supply chain security addresses two critical issues: preventing untrusted code from entering production, and ensuring that compliance & auditability are integrated into everyday workflow. In 2026, Supply chain security is an integral part of the delivery pipeline itself, giving teams the confidence to ship applications much faster and more easily at their own pace.

When Dependency Compromise Turns Into Pipeline Control

Once a dependency is poisoned, whether by a corrupted maintainer account, a malicious update, or a manipulated release, it cannot be isolated. CI/CD pipelines pull these dependencies with each build, essentially serving as distribution engines. What starts as a minor upstream flaw can swiftly spread to various services, repositories, and environments without causing alerts.

The true hazard lies within the pipeline itself. Build systems execute dependent code with elevated permissions, which frequently include access to secrets, signing keys, and deployment credentials. If a malicious dependency is programmed to run at build time, it can alter artifacts as they are made, insert new steps into the pipeline, or surreptitiously exfiltrate important credentials. At this point, the attacker is not only altering code - they are influencing how software is built.

This tendency has already been observed in real-world occurrences. The GhostAction campaign exposed how attackers used trusted GitHub Actions workflows to steal secrets and tokens from thousands of repositories. The application code itself stayed unchanged. Attackers exploited CI/CD trust connections, showing how dependency-level breach can lead to full pipeline control. Everything seemed genuine since the pipeline was doing exactly what it was supposed to do.

When attackers take control of the construction process, the consequences multiply. Compromise artifacts are signed, saved, and delivered just like any other release. Downstream surroundings believe them since they come from "our pipeline." Traditional security measures focus on clean code and legitimate signatures, oblivious that the trust chain has been broken upstream.

This is why dependency compromise is no longer only a library problem, but also a pipeline concern. When CI/CD systems assume that every component they assemble is trustworthy, a single poisoned dependency can turn the entire delivery pipeline into an attack vector. And by the time the problem is discovered, the breached software has frequently already entered production.

Attacking the Build, Not the Application

Modern software delivery is becoming more automated. We rely on CI/CD pipelines to fetch code, run tests, assemble artifacts, sign binaries, and deploy them to production. Most security solutions presume that if your source code is clean, the finished product is secure. Today's attackers, however, have discovered a more potent tactic: they break your build process, rather than your application.

The purpose of this attack style is not to uncover a flaw in the code you developed; rather, it is to tamper with the software's production environment. Anyone who has ever configured a build agent understands that it contains secrets such as environment variables, repository credentials, signing keys, and cloud permissions. A hacked build step or tool can transition from retrieving dependencies to covertly introducing harmful operations during the construction phase — long before the code reaches the production stage.

Imagine a scenario in which a build script uses an apparently benign tool or plugin. Instead of merely aiding with the development, that component has been modified to alter the binary as it is generated, inject logging that exfiltrates passwords, or append backdoors that only execute in runtime environments. Because the source code has not changed, static analysis and dependency scanners do not detect any issues. The build leaves "successfully" with a green checkmark, yet the artifact performs differently in production.

This isn't theoretical. Adversaries did not exploit a defect in the application in attacks like SolarWinds or other supply-chain compromises; instead, they altered the way the software was generated by injecting malicious components into the build environment itself. Even if the application code was not vulnerable, the build process became the vector that propagated the malicious behaviour across the environment and customers.

The result is subtle and dangerous: teams believe they are deploying secure software because all security gates were cleared, but in reality, the build has become an attack surface. Application-focused defenses completely overlook this since they never look at how the program was built or whether the build pipeline itself was affected.

To combat this, modern supply-chain security prioritizes building integrity and provenance, which includes cryptographically signing every item, validating build environments, and enforcing policy at each stage of the pipeline. Only then can teams transition from relying on "what passed" to confirming "how it was built."

CI/CD As A High-Privilege Target

CI/CD pipelines tend to be referred to as "automation," but they are actually among the most privileged systems in contemporary infrastructure. They can push images to registries, view source code, pull dependencies, access secrets, sign artifacts, and deploy straight into production. From an attacker's point of view, compromising CI/CD is strategic as well as convenient.

What makes CI/CD especially attractive is that it sits at the intersection of trust and authority. Developers trust pipelines as they are automated, and trusted by infrastructure as they are authenticated. An attacker does not need to take advantage of specific servers or applications; once they have access to a pipeline, they inherit those true relationships with the systems.

Most CI/CD environments store high-value secrets by design. To enable unattended builds, environment variables such as cloud credentials, API tokens, signing keys, and deployment permissions are injected. Secrets can be discreetly exfiltrated or used elsewhere if a pipeline step is compromised. Nothing shatters. There are no crashes. These attacks frequently go undetected for extended periods of time since the pipeline still "works."

Attackers can quickly move from a single compromised workflow to more extensive access across repositories and cloud environments, as demonstrated by misuse of GitHub Actions, Jenkins plugins, and third-party CI extensions. In these situations, the pipeline serves as both the distribution conduit and the execution engine for malicious modifications, all the while giving downstream systems the impression that it is legitimate.

CI/CD compromise's blast radius is hazardous. Software is frequently created for several services, settings, or clients using a single pipeline. Once infiltrated, attackers can alter all generated artifacts, sign malicious releases using legitimate keys, and implement modifications that are identical to standard updates. At that time, the attack is systematic rather than isolated.

Because of this, contemporary supply-chain security views CI/CD as essential infrastructure rather than only developer tools. Reducing access, separating build environments, requiring artifact signing, and verifying provenance at every level are all part of pipeline security. Without these safeguards, CI/CD continues to be a potent but vulnerable point of failure, which hackers are more willing to take advantage of.

How Supply Chain Attacks Bypass Application Security Controls

The majority of application security controls are made to address a very particular query: Is this code vulnerable? Dependency scanners search for known CVEs, container scanners identify out-of-date packages, and static analysis tools examine source code. Teams can reasonably expect that the program is safe to ship when all of these checks are successful.

Supply-chain assaults take advantage of the fact that these tools concentrate on the appearance of the program rather than its origins.

The application code may be entirely uncontaminated in a supply-chain attack. There are no glaring weaknesses to find, no questionable reasoning to report, and no malfunctioning tests. Rather, during dependency resolution, build execution, artifact creation, or deployment, the compromise takes place surrounding the code. From a traditional DevSecOps perspective, the final output should match what a pipeline expects.

Content verified by security scanners, but supply-chain hacks alter context. Only during build time can a malicious dependent act differently. Changes may be injected by a compromised pipeline step after static analysis has completed. It is possible to make changes to a poisoned artifact after scanning but before signing. Controls shoot precisely as intended in each instance, but the assault is still missed.

Timing is another way these attacks get past defenses. Early in the pipeline, application security tests are frequently front-loaded. Downstream stages blindly trust the output once the code has passed those gates. An attacker inherits that trust if they have access later in the process, such as during packaging, signing, or publishing. Because previous processes were successful, the artifact is regarded as "verified."

Automation exacerbates this disparity. Instead of skepticism, CI/CD pipelines are geared for speed and reproducibility. They assume that outputs are deterministic and inputs are reliable. Because no human will manually re-inspect the final product before deployment, attackers take advantage of this assumption by concealing harmful behavior inside trusted processes.

The end effect is a perilous delusion of security. Because all controls were passed, teams think their application is safe, but in actuality, the trust chain has been violated. Because of this, contemporary supply-chain security places greater emphasis on ensuring provenance, integrity, and policy verification throughout the entire delivery process — not just at the code level — than it does on identifying flaws.

Final Thoughts

So here's the real question this article leaves us with:

Do we really secure software, or are we only protecting the visible portions?

The majority of teams don't disregard supply-chain security due to negligence. They ignore it because, for a long time, code scanning and vulnerability checks felt sufficient. Pipelines were functional. releases have been sent. Up until it did, nothing broke.

However, trust goes farther than we realize in a world where software is delivered by fully automated mechanisms and constructed from hundreds of dependencies. Everything that occurs in production downstream can be subtly influenced by a single assumption made upstream.

So, it's worth pausing and asking:

→ Are we aware of the true source of our software?

→ Can we explain not only that it passed but also how it was constructed?

→ Could we identify the source of trust if something went wrong tomorrow?

These are no longer theoretical inquiries. They are evolving into operational ones.

The change in DevSecOps has nothing to do with compliance or terror. It has to do with clarity. "This should be safe" gives way to "we can prove why it is." Pipelines can be trusted by habit or verified by design.

And perhaps the most crucial query of all:

Would your delivery pipeline be safe if hackers ceased focusing on your application code tomorrow?

Thank you for reading 🤝