November 19, 2026
A 15-year-old server, default passwords and a folder full of secrets: why this SME needed Linux
A field audit in northern Italy reveals why a small business needed Linux and open source to regain control.

By Mišo Oroz
3 min read
A small company in Osio Sotto, near Bergamo. They work with composite materials: fiberglass, carbon fiber, kevlar. Boat repairs, radio enclosures, custom bodywork, waterjet cutting. Skilled hands-on work that has nothing to do with managing servers.
Their IT infrastructure had been running for years without anyone really looking at it.
They knew something was wrong. They just did not know how wrong.
I spent three hours there on a Tuesday morning in October.
The first thing I found was the server. An IBM System x, manufactured in 2011. Fifteen years old, still running production workloads, still holding the company's data. The most recent field replacement unit logged on the server dated from 2016. It would die one day, without warning, and that would be that.
The second thing I found was a physical folder. A ring binder, sitting in the server room. Inside: the WiFi password, the server credentials, the NAS password, the CCTV password, the passwords for every PC in the office. All written by hand. All in plain text. The folder was accessible to anyone with physical access to the room.
The NAS displayed a warning on its management interface: "Remote Access may not be functioning." Nobody had noticed. The device was end of life, no longer receiving firmware updates.
The physical alarm system had a battery replacement warning that had been active since July 2024. Over two years. Nobody had called the installer.
The IMM management module on the IBM server allows full remote control of the hardware over the network. It was running on factory default credentials. Username: USERID. Password: PASSW0RD, where the zero is the number, not the letter. This is documented in IBM's own published manuals as the out-of-the-box default. It had never been changed.
None of this is unusual.
I want to be clear about that. This is not a careless company. They are a real business run by real people who are good at what they do, which is working with composite materials, not managing IT infrastructure. The situation I found there is a pattern I encounter frequently in small businesses in this area. The server gets older every year. The passwords get written down because nobody set up a password manager. The warnings get ignored because there is no one whose job it is to read them.
The problem is not negligence. The problem is that nobody ever looked.
The GDPR exposure was significant. Personal data appeared to be accessible through default credentials. No documented access control policy was identified. No evidence of encryption at rest was observed. No verified offsite backup procedure was in place. A breach in this environment would have been difficult to contain and would have required a clear incident-response process.
What made this company different from most I visit is that they wanted to fix it. They already knew something was off. They just needed someone to walk in, look at everything, and tell them clearly what needed to change and in what order.
That is what an audit is for.
The proposal I put together after that morning was not about selling Linux or new hardware for the sake of it. It was about replacing what was genuinely at end of life, removing what was genuinely dangerous, and building something stable enough that they would not need to have this conversation again for the next ten years.
Where open source tools offered a clear advantage, they were the natural choice. A private, self-hosted Nextcloud instance replaced the fragmented drive mapping and the end-of-life NAS. The practical effect surprised them: files accessible from a browser, from a phone, from anywhere. Documents edited without emailing attachments back and forth. Internal communication through Nextcloud Talk without adding another external service. It changed how they approached their own workflow, not because someone told them it would, but because they found it easier.
The workstations moved to Linux with KDE Plasma as the desktop environment. Nobody commented on the transition. The interface was familiar enough that it did not require explanation. What they did comment on was the speed: machines that had felt slow for years were suddenly responsive. KDE stayed out of the way. That is exactly what it should do.
This is what Zerolock does. Not migration for its own sake, but a deliberate shift toward infrastructure that can be understood, controlled, and maintained without depending on a single vendor or a proprietary black box.
One thing I decided not to touch: the CNC machines on the production floor. Those stay exactly as they are. You do not migrate a production line to prove a point.
One office workstation stayed on Windows as well. The CAD software it runs has no viable Linux equivalent for this workflow. That machine stays exactly as it is, but it was isolated as much as possible from the rest of the network. It does one thing. Everything else was removed.
Linux was not presented as an ideology. It was presented as a practical foundation: stable, transparent, and flexible enough to support the parts of the business that could be modernised without disrupting production. For this company, open source was not a slogan. It was a way to reduce dependency, improve control, and build an IT environment that could be understood and managed over time.
The lesson I take from every audit like this one is simple.
The risk is not that something will go wrong. The risk is that something has already gone wrong and nobody knows yet.
The folder with the passwords is still sitting somewhere. The server is still running. The warning light is still on.
Until someone looks.