The 62nd Munich Security Conference (MSC 2026), held in Munich from Feb. 13–15, unfolded in a climate of acute international uncertainty. What stood out was not simply the number of simultaneous crises, but the growing sense that the international system is struggling to generate durable solutions. This edition felt less like a conventional venue for managing crises and more like a reflection of a deeper structural shift in global security — where military tensions increasingly intersect with economic volatility, technological disruption, and information warfare. That mood was captured by the Munich Security Report 2026, themed "Under Destruction." The report's framing highlighted the risks associated with political and intellectual currents that prefer "demolition" over "reform," and that increasingly view established international arrangements as over-bureaucratic and beyond repair. The issue is no longer limited to imperfect institutional performance; it is the weakening of the tools of cooperation themselves. A recurring dilemma ran through many discussions: if the post–World War II norms and rules are eroding, are we seeing the emergence of a new order — or entering a prolonged, unstable transition defined by fragmentation and contested legitimacy? Several files dominated the agenda, foremost among them the future of the transatlantic relationship. Debates sharpened around the evolving role of the United States and shifting priorities in Washington, while Europe continued to face pressure to increase defense spending and assume greater responsibility for its own security. "European defense autonomy" appeared as an increasingly mature direction, with calls to strengthen Europe's defense-industrial base and technological capabilities to confront threats that are no longer purely conventional — ranging from hybrid warfare and cyberattacks to economic coercion and supply-chain vulnerability. Ukraine remained central as a test of deterrence and the sustainability of long-term support. In parallel, intensive consultations addressed Middle Eastern crises — especially Gaza — reinforcing the impression that the international system is now managing multiple, simultaneous shocks that strain both state capacity and institutional bandwidth. Prioritization itself has become a strategic challenge, and the cumulative effect is a world in which escalation risks multiply faster than mechanisms to contain them. The technological race — and artificial intelligence in particular — featured prominently. Discussions emphasized the security implications of advanced AI, cybersecurity, and information operations, with repeated warnings that the digital front is no longer merely supportive to conflict but can become decisive. Critical infrastructure, public trust, and governmental decision-making processes are increasingly exposed to disruption and manipulation. For many states, the ability to secure the information domain and protect essential services is rapidly becoming as fundamental as traditional military readiness. Within the broader category of cross-border threats, a sensitive issue emerged in side discussions with direct implications for Iraq and regional stability: the transfer of ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq. It was noted that more than 5,000 detainees have reportedly been transferred. This development was presented as part of a shifting approach to the detention burden in northeast Syria, amid fragile guarding arrangements, funding uncertainty, and overlapping calculations among local and international actors. A key conclusion followed: transfers alone do not reduce the threat unless matched by an integrated framework — secure and well-resourced detention facilities, precise intelligence management, an effective judicial track that balances rule-of-law requirements with security imperatives, robust measures to prevent radicalization inside prisons and after release, and expanded international cooperation in information-sharing and technical support. On Iran, deliberations carried a sharper tone, reflecting a trajectory toward confrontation and renewed nuclear competition. Many discussions suggested that the nuclear deal is increasingly treated as a legacy framework, while attention shifts toward "integrated deterrence" aimed at preventing Iran from crossing the threshold of weaponization, alongside concerns about ballistic missile capabilities. In side meetings, the scenario of "regime collapse" surfaced repeatedly. Despite the presence of more confrontational voices — and notwithstanding proposals advanced by elements of the opposition — the dominant assessments warned that abrupt collapse could produce wide-scale chaos due to the absence of a credible alternative capable of governing the "day after," unless a significant fracture emerges from within the system itself. Many participants underscored that Iran's case differs fundamentally from Iraq in 2003. For Iraq, these debates are not theoretical. Any significant escalation linked to Iran would open a spectrum of risks: instability along the eastern border; deeper internal polarization; and the possibility of indiscriminate targeting of foreign interests, which could trigger domestic tension and security complications. Economic shocks would likely follow, affecting trade flows, energy markets, and supply chains. Accordingly, the conclusion most consistent with Iraq's national interest is the imperative to keep Iraq out of regional confrontation and strengthen internal resilience — by consolidating the primacy of the state, maintaining disciplined security management, and reinforcing sovereign national decision-making so Iraq is not pulled into conflicts that do not serve Iraqi citizens. In a world shifting from crisis management toward preparing for an era of fragmentation, national capacity-building and spillover prevention should be defining tasks — protecting the state, society, and economy from regional turbulence and the uncertainties of an evolving global order.