November 17, 2026
1. Lab Overview & Environment Summary
This report documents a multi-stage web application penetration test conducted against the internal SecureCorp Employee Portal…
By Gulshan Kumar
6 min read
- 1 2. Screenshot 1: Information Disclosure via Debug Endpoint Enumeration
- 2 3. Screenshot 2: Authenticating to the Employee Portal
- 3 4. Screenshot 3: Post-Authentication Enumeration & Attack Surface Discovery
- 4 5. Screenshot 4: Intercepting the Asset Fetch Request in Burp Suite
- 5 6. Screenshot 5: Baseline Request Verification in Burp Repeater
Web Application Penetration Testing: Chaining Information Disclosure & SSRF on SecureCorp Portal
This report documents a multi-stage web application penetration test conducted against the internal SecureCorp Employee Portal (http://192.168.1.7). The assessment demonstrates how an unauthenticated attacker can chain an exposed debugging endpoint (Information Disclosure) with hardcoded developer credentials to gain authenticated portal access, and subsequently exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a legacy asset synchronization feature to access restricted internal loopback resources.
Component / MetricObserved ValueTechnical SignificanceAttacker WorkstationKali LinuxSource host executing reconnaissance via curl, Firefox, and Burp Suite Community Edition.Target Web Server192.168.1.7 (Port 80 / HTTP)Runs Apache/2.4.58 (Ubuntu) with PHP 8.3.6 and SQLite (internal_storage.db).Internal Host MetadataSECURE-CORP-SRV-01 (10.0.5.12)Disclosed via verbose system diagnostic output on /error.php.Captured Flag 1FLAG{DEBUG_LOG_SENSITIVE_LEAK}Extracted from unencrypted memory buffer logs in /error.php?system=test&debug=true.Leaked Credentialsabhishek / hunter@123Hardcoded developer test credentials discovered in dev_config.json log entry.Captured Flag 2FLAG{INTERNAL_SSRF_BYPASS_SUCCESS}Retrieved by exploiting SSRF in /api_fetch.php to request http://127.0.0.1/secret.
2. Screenshot 1: Information Disclosure via Debug Endpoint Enumeration
Figure 1: Querying the exposed /error.php endpoint with debug=true via curl reveals system diagnostics, an unencrypted flag, and hardcoded credentials.
Objective: Identify misconfigured diagnostic or debugging endpoints on the target web server (192.168.1.7) that leak sensitive environment configuration or authentication material to unauthenticated users.
Action Performed: From the Kali Linux terminal, a silent HTTP GET request (-s) was issued using curl to the /error.php script with the query parameters system=test and debug=true appended:
curl -s 'http://192.168.1.7/error.php?system=test&debug=true'curl -s 'http://192.168.1.7/error.php?system=test&debug=true'Observation & Technical Impact: Instead of returning a generic error message, the web application responded with a raw JSON object containing sensitive internal state data across five categories (system_info, environment_vars, internal_logs, loaded_modules, and request_metadata). Reviewing the internal_logs array revealed two high-severity findings:
- Memory Buffer Flag Leak: The log entry at
11:02:30states:SEC_ALERT: Unencrypted flag found in memory buffer: FLAG{DEBUG_LOG_SENSITIVE_LEAK}. - Hardcoded Credentials Exposure: The log entry at
11:02:20(highlighted in the red box) states:AUTH: Found hardcoded test credentials in dev_config.json: [username=abhishek password=hunter@123], alongside a trace log confirming thatdashboard.phpis rendered for userabhishek.
3. Screenshot 2: Authenticating to the Employee Portal
Figure 2: Entering the leaked credentials (abhishek / hunter@123) into the SecureCorp Employee Portal login form at /index.php.
Objective: Verify whether the hardcoded developer credentials recovered from the debug log dump grant valid authenticated access to the SecureCorp Internal Employee Portal.
Action Performed: Navigated to http://192.168.1.7/index.php in the Firefox browser, populated the Username field with abhishek and the Password field with hunter@123, and clicked the Sign In button.
Observation & Technical Impact: The login succeeded immediately, demonstrating that development credentials left in configuration files (dev_config.json) remained active on the server and allowed a complete bypass of perimeter authentication controls.
4. Screenshot 3: Post-Authentication Enumeration & Attack Surface Discovery
Figure 3: Post-authentication dashboard (/dashboard.php) displaying internal modules, with the red arrow pointing to the "Select Avatar" button under Avatar Sync.
Objective: Enumerate the authenticated user attack surface to identify web functionality that accepts external URLs or interacts with backend network services.
Action Performed: Upon landing on http://192.168.1.7/dashboard.php (Hello, Abhishek!), inspected the four available application modules: Directory, Support, Profile, and Avatar Sync. Clicked the Select Avatar button under the Avatar Sync card.
Observation & Technical Impact: Profile avatar synchronization tools frequently allow users to specify a remote URL from which the web server fetches an image or data stream. If the backend does not strictly validate the destination address, such functionality can be abused for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).
5. Screenshot 4: Intercepting the Asset Fetch Request in Burp Suite
Figure 4: Submitting http://192.168.1.7 into the Avatar Sync (Legacy) form and intercepting the resulting POST /api_fetch.php request in Burp Suite Proxy to forward it to Repeater.
Objective: Capture and inspect the raw HTTP request generated by the legacy Avatar Sync endpoint (/api_fetch.php) to understand how user-supplied URLs are transmitted to the server.
Action Performed: On http://192.168.1.7/api_fetch.php (titled Avatar Sync (Legacy) — Fetch assets from remote or internal endpoints), entered http://192.168.1.7 into the Enter Asset URL input box and clicked Sync Asset with Burp Suite Proxy interception enabled. Right-clicked the captured request in the Proxy → Intercept tab and selected Send to Repeater (Ctrl+R).
Observation & Technical Impact: Inspection of the intercepted traffic reveals an HTTP POST request to /api_fetch.php carrying the session cookie (PHPSESSID=a3rq762fnus725tg6ro16urn2j; user_role=employee) and the form-urlencoded body parameter on line 16: url=http%3A%2F%2F192.168.1.7. This confirms that the backend directly accepts a full URL scheme and host address from client input.
6. Screenshot 5: Baseline Request Verification in Burp Repeater
Figure 5: Executing the unmodified POST /api_fetch.php request in Burp Repeater and observing the reflected HTML response in the right pane.
Objective: Establish a baseline response in Burp Repeater to verify whether the application reflects the fetched remote resource back to the client (In-Band SSRF) or suppresses the output (Blind SSRF).
Action Performed: Switched to the Repeater tab in Burp Suite and clicked Send with the baseline payload url=http%3A%2F%2F192.168.1.7.
Observation & Technical Impact: The server returned an HTTP/1.1 200 OK status (Content-Length: 9430) containing the complete HTML source code of the SecureCorp Employee Portal. Because the server returns the fetched response body directly within the HTTP response, this is a full In-Band (Non-Blind) SSRF vulnerability that allows the attacker to read the contents of internal web resources.
7. Screenshot 6: Probing Internal Loopback (127.0.0.1) via SSRF
Figure 6: Modifying the url POST parameter in Burp Repeater to target http://127.0.0.1/ and confirming a larger Content-Length: 9677 response.
Objective: Test whether the backend server enforces any input validation or IP blacklisting to block requests directed at its own local loopback interface (127.0.0.1).
Action Performed: Modified line 16 of the POST /api_fetch.php request body in Burp Repeater to point to the loopback address and clicked Send:
url=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%2Furl=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%2FObservation & Technical Impact: The server processed the loopback request and returned HTTP/1.1 200 OK, but the response Content-Length increased from 9430 bytes to 9677 bytes. This increase of 247 bytes indicates that when the application detects a request originating from 127.0.0.1, it appends additional internal system data to the response body.
8. Screenshot 7: Exploiting SSRF to Access /secret in Burp Repeater
Figure 7: Targeting http://127.0.0.1/secret in Burp Repeater exposes FLAG{INTERNAL_SSRF_BYPASS_SUCCESS} and the hidden /admin.php path inside the HTML response.
Objective: Extract restricted internal secrets by directing the SSRF payload to the loopback-only /secret endpoint discovered in the system log hint.
Action Performed: Scrolling down the response from the loopback probe revealed a banner stating: System Log: Internal Loopback Detected. Try fetching /secret. Updated line 16 in Burp Repeater to fetch /secret over loopback and clicked Send:
url=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%2Fsecreturl=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%2FsecretObservation & Technical Impact: Inspecting lines 95–106 of the raw HTML response confirmed successful exploitation. The application rendered a Vulnerability Confirmed badge and populated the `
` container with two critical confidential artifacts:
- SSRF Exploitation Flag:
FLAG{INTERNAL_SSRF_BYPASS_SUCCESS} - Administrative Endpoint Disclosure:
CONFIDENTIAL: Internal Admin Portal is located at /admin.php
9. Screenshot 8: Visual Proof-of-Concept Confirmation in the Browser
Figure 8: Submitting http://127.0.0.1/secret directly in the web browser on /api_fetch.php renders the captured SSRF flag and confidential /admin.php notice in the Stream Data Preview pane.
Objective: Reproduce and document the SSRF exploit directly inside the web browser UI to provide a clear visual Proof of Concept (PoC).
Action Performed: Returned to the Firefox browser on http://192.168.1.7/api_fetch.php, typed http://127.0.0.1/secret into the Enter Asset URL field, and clicked Sync Asset.
Observation & Technical Impact: The web interface displayed the confirmation alert Resource synchronized successfully. and rendered the Vulnerability Confirmed badge inside the Stream Data Preview panel, visibly displaying both FLAG{INTERNAL_SSRF_BYPASS_SUCCESS} and CONFIDENTIAL: Internal Admin Portal is located at /admin.php.
10. Remediation Recommendations
Recommended Security Controls to Mitigate the Identified Vulnerabilities:
- Disable Production Debug Modes & Sanitize Logs: Remove
?debug=truehandlers and verbose diagnostic scripts (/error.php) from production environments, and ensureAPP_DEBUGis set tofalse. Never log plaintext flags, memory buffers, or credentials. - Eliminate Hardcoded Credentials: Remove plaintext test accounts (
abhishek/hunter@123) from configuration files (dev_config.json) and manage secrets using environment variables or dedicated secret vaults.