August 1, 2026
Incident Analysis & Response: Check Point Security Gateway CVE-2024–24919 LFI Exploitation
Introduction & Overview
By Ben Rubin (Zedocun)
2 min read
Introduction & Overview
As an Incident Response (IR) analyst, encountering vulnerabilities in perimeter security devices demands rapid, methodical triage. In this incident case study, we analyze a real-world exploitation attempt targeting a Check Point Security Gateway via CVE-2024–24919 — a zero-day Arbitrary File Read vulnerability.
This post details the full lifecycle of the alert, from initial SIEM detection and raw web access log inspection to threat intelligence verification, showing how the attack was identified, scoped, and handled.
Phase 1: Alert Detection & Triage
The incident originated from a high-priority SIEM alert (SOC287) indicating suspicious activity hitting the Check Point Security Gateway.
- Event ID: 263
- Event Time: Jun, 06, 2024, 03:12 PM
- Source IP Address: 203.160.68.12
- Destination IP Address: 172.16.20.146 (CP-Spark-Gateway-01)
- Initial Classification: True Positive (TP). The traffic was confirmed as an active, unauthorized external attack matching exploit patterns for CVE-2024–24919.
Phase 2: Threat Intelligence & Attribution
To understand the scope of the attacking entity, the source IP (203.160.68.12) was cross-referenced with threat intelligence feeds.
- ASN/ISP: AS 10099 (China Unicom Global)
- Community Score: Flagged as malicious across 8 security vendors (including Chong Lua Dao, CyRadar, GreyNoise, and Forcepoint ThreatSeeker).
Phase 3: Log Analysis & Investigation
To understand the nature of the request, we inspected the raw web access logs on the gateway (/var/log/access.log).
The attacker leveraged a POST request tailored to exploit CVE-2024–24919, utilizing Path Traversal to request sensitive system files.
Key Findings from the Logs:
- Target 1 (
/etc/passwd): The attacker successfully extracted system metadata and user accounts, receiving an HTTP200 OKstatus with a payload size of 1256 bytes. - Target 2 (
/etc/shadow): A subsequent attempt by IP 203.160.68.13 to access higher-privilege files was successfully blocked, returning an HTTP403 Forbiddenstatus code.
Phase 4: Firewall & Infrastructure Validation
Correlating the web logs with the firewall logs verified the connection flows and ports utilized during the attack lifecycle.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) & Tagging
The following indicators were extracted and tagged for tracking within the SOC environment:
- 203.160.68.12 (IP Address) — External Attacker Source IP (China Unicom Global)
- 172.16.20.146 (IP Address) — Target Check Point Gateway (CP-Spark-Gateway-01)
- /etc/passwd (File Path) — Target of Successful LFI Extraction
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- Tactic: Initial Access / Reconnaissance & Discovery
- Technique: Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) — Targeting CVE-2024–24919.
- Technique: Automated Exfiltration / Data from Local System (T1005) — Reading system files via LFI (/etc/passwd).
Conclusion & Remediation
This incident highlights the critical danger of unpatched perimeter appliances. Although the attacker successfully achieved Arbitrary File Read (exposing system user structures via /etc/passwd), the defense-in-depth posture prevented escalation, command execution, and lateral movement.
Required Remediation Steps:
- Isolate and patch the Check Point Security Gateway with the official vendor hotfix for CVE-2024–24919.
- Block attacker IP 203.160.68.12 and associated subnets across all perimeter firewalls.
- Escalate the incident to Tier 2 / Incident Response for deep-dive artifact preservation and credential rotation for exposed system accounts.